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Abstract: The paper presents a synthesis of research results that focus on identifying factors that 
affect the organization and functioning of Iraq's air defense system during the Iraqi Freedom operation 
and, as a result, contributed to Iraq's defeat. An important part of the considerations presented in the 
article are the results of research relating to the role and significance of the use by the coalition part-
ners of the state-of-the-art air weapon systems, which facilitated carrying out very precise strikes on the 
most essential elements of the Iraqi air defense system beyond the reach of the anti-aircraft artillery and 
missile systems. The authors also indicate that of the vital importance in the lack of adequate protection 
of the most important objects, the so-called centers of gravity, located mainly in Baghdad, were organi-
zational errors in the distribution of forces and resources, technological problems, and inept command. 
The paper is concluded with a reflection on the gained knowledge on the influence of the experience 
gathered from the Iraqi Freedom operation on the processes of technological modernization of the 
armed forces, and especially air defense that is still based on the technology from the 1960s and 1970s. 
 
Keywords:  air defense system, centers of gravity, air attack, close air support, active defense. 
 
 
Introduction 
Analyzing the concepts of conducting air operations at the end of the 20
th
 and the beginning of the 
21
st
 century, one can see a change in the Clausewitzian victory paradigm – victory through destruction. 
This is since more and more advanced technologies allow for precise, even surgical strikes at carefully 
selected targets, the destruction of which should bring forth the breaking of the will of a given nation, 
government, or their subordination. As a result, the war and its conduct became more (although not spa-
tially) limited (Świniarski & Wiatr, 1998). Despite a significant change in the paradigm of war and the 
dynamic development of airpower, the following words were spoken years ago by Sir Winston Church-
ill: ―Air power is the most difficult of all forms of military force to measure, or even to express in pre-
cise terms‖ (MoD, 2015, p. 13) They have lost nothing of their relevance. In contemporary air opera-
tions, limiting the damage and losses not only of one's own but also of the opponent, including the civil-
ian population, have grown into the basic canon of modern war (Kuriata, 1998). It also applies to the 
Iraqi Freedom operation. 
In this context, it should be emphasized that after the rapid defeat of Iraq in the 2003 war, there 
are still many discussions on its main reasons. In this paper, the authors focused on the assessment of the 
organization and functioning of the air defense system in war conditions, which were recognized as one 
of the key elements that directly contributed to the final result. In this respect, based on the results of the 
research conducted at the Polish Air Force University in Dęblin, one can conclude that despite extensive 
organizational efforts, the Iraqis failed to properly prepare their air defense system to confront the air 
forces of the two leading countries of the Iraqi Freedom operation, i.e., USA and Great Britain. This 
resulted, among other things, from the fact that starting from 1991, in accordance with a UN Security 
Council resolution, an embargo was imposed on Iraq that banned the sale of any weapons by other coun-
tries. Among other things, it was for these reasons why Iraq found it very difficult to expand its aviation 
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potential and develop air defense. The Iraqi army had in its possession only old technologies – from the 
1960s and 1970s that needed modernization and replacement for better quality anti-aircraft systems. It 
was, however, impossible to implement in a short time. Under these conditions, Iraq organized a provi-
sional but relatively strong air defense system, which was based on a large number of various rocket and 
artillery systems deployed in the regions of Baghdad and Tirkit, as well as at several other important 
objects. 
Preliminary studies carried out on the Iraqi air defense during the Iraqi Freedom operation con-
firmed the hypotheses that the state of knowledge in this area required more detailed examination and 
development. Most of the scientific publications describing activities during the Iraqi Freedom focus on 
their analysis from the point of view of ground forces or air forces, but not air defense, which is a basic 
determinant in maintaining the viability by the centers of gravity (which are also vital targets for a given 
state or its armed forces). The information, available in the subject literature, about the organization and 
operation of the Iraqi air defense in the Iraqi Freedom operation, is usually incomplete and fragmentary. 
That is why the authors assessed the current state of knowledge as unsatisfactory. In this situation, they 
decided that this is a sufficiently valid reason to investigate this problem in-depth, and the results of the 
research are presented in this paper. 
From the above-presented problem, the subject of research has emerged, i.e., the Iraqi air defense 
system in the conditions of confrontation with the air forces of the coalition partners during the Iraqi 
Freedom operation. 
Therefore, it was assumed that the research goal of the paper is to provide a characteristic of the 
organization and operation of the Iraqi air defense system in the conditions of airstrikes carried out by 
the coalition aviation during the Iraqi Freedom operation. 
The analysis of the manner of achieving such a formulated goal led the authors to order the further 
research steps by formulating the main scientific problem with the following way: How was the Iraqi air 
defense system organized and operated during the Iraqi Freedom operation and what were the effects? 
The methods used for the research were mainly theoretical; among the methods employed were 
analysis, synthesis, analogy, generalization, and deduction. The analysis was used because the subject of 
the study turned out to be too complex to be studied in its entirety. 
Searching for answers to the main research problem and the purpose of a detailed understanding of 
the subject of research, critical literature analysis, and examination of documents were used. The analy-
sis and synthesis were performed to obtain the most reliable information about the subject of the re-
search. The implementation of these methods allowed for describing the strengths and weaknesses of the 
organization and functioning of the Iraqi air defense system during the Iraqi Freedom operation. Gener-
alization and analogy were used to determine the group of factors that had the greatest impact on the 
organization and use of the anti-aircraft forces in the situation of mass air raids. The deduction was used 
in the process of drawing conclusions about the strengths and weaknesses of the Iraqi air defense system 
in the context of confrontation with modern air forces. 
 
1. Characteristics of the coalition air forces operations in the Iraqi Freedom op-
eration 
It should be emphasized that the political and military situation prior to the commencement of Op-
eration Iraqi Freedom was favorable to the commencement of the air operation, the purpose of which 
was to simultaneously win an advantage in the air and strike at the centers of gravity of Iraq. This was 
favored by, among others, by UN Security Council Resolution 688 that called on Iraq to cease ethnic 
cleansing on the Kurdish and Shiite people. As part of these actions, as early as August 26, 1992, the no-
fly zones were introduced in Iraq. They were established to ensure the free carrying out of reconnais-
sance missions by the coalition air forces, and thus facilitate the constant control over compliance with 
the provisions of the UN Security Council Resolution. At the same time, they were forbidden zones for 
Iraqi aircraft of all types. The border of the designated zones was drawn above the 36
th
 parallel in the 
north of Iraq and below the 33rd parallel in the south. 
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Figure 1: No-fly zones in Iraq 
Source: https://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/news/iraq/2000/45303.htm 
 
Operations carried out as part of the no-fly zone control were named ―Operation Northern Watch‖ 
and ―Operation Southern Watch.‖ In order to coordinate the operations, the Americans formed Joint 
Task Force Southwest Asia, whose operational center was located in Al Udedi, Qatar, while air bases 
were located in Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Bahrain. In total, until the start of the Iraqi Freedom 
operation, the forces involved in controlling the airspace over Iraq consisted of about 200 combat air-
craft and 6,000 personnel (Heliński, 2003, p. 102). 
The introduction of no-fly zones met with strong opposition from Iraq. Despite the coalition‘s 
warnings, Iraq did not withdraw its anti-aircraft systems from their positions and started firing at the 
coalition aircraft. The number of attacks on air targets was steadily increasing, as did the number of re-
taliation actions undertaken by the Allies. At the end of 1998, there was regular warfare taking place, not 
a mission aimed at controlling the implementation of the UN Resolution. In the period from December 
1998 to January 2001 alone, Iraqi aircraft violated the southern zone more than 470 times, and over 670 
accidents of targeting or firing at coalition planes by Iraqi anti-aircraft defense systems were recorded 
(Radomyski, 2009, p. 148). At that time, the coalition air forces carried out around 22,000 combat flights 
by opened fire over 350 times (Cordesman & Arleigh, 2003, p. 192). In this regard, one may conclude 
that even before the start of the Iraqi Freedom operations, both sides had already conducted regular acts 
of war. As a result of coalition air force strikes on the anti-aircraft systems, air control was obtained even 
before the start of the joint operation (Mosley, 2003). Airstrikes had intensified even more since the be-
ginning of 2003 – there were around 170 rocket-bomb strikes almost exclusively with the use of preci-
sion ammunition. In some cases, these attacks went beyond the zone defined by the UN mandate, and 
the B-1B bombers were used to attack radar stations just before the outbreak of the conflict (Cordesman 
& Arleigh, 2003, p. 149). 
Thus, the advantage gained by the coalition enabled them to redirect the effort from fighting for 
the control of the airspace to carrying out strikes at the centers of gravity of Iraq and to support the land 
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forces. Despite the Southern Watch and Northen Watch operations, it was expected that Iraq would still 
retain the command structure and control of the anti-aircraft systems that were located in underground 
shelters and bunkers. 
For the purposes of efficient conducting of a military operation against Iraq in the Persian Gulf re-
gion, a strong group of air, navy, and land forces was organized that amounted to about 300,000 soldiers 
with more than 1,000 tactical combat aircraft, 47 B-52N, B-1B, B2A strategic bombers, over 100 war-
ships, of which 35 carried Tomahawk missiles. Military operations in Iraq were also supported by other 
forces, including satellite reconnaissance and guidance systems. In total, the aviation potential accumu-
lated in the Persian Gulf consisted of 1801 combat and auxiliary aircraft. The US Air Force (USAF) 
provided 51% of the combat aircraft and all heavy bombers. Most refueling, transport, and reconnais-
sance aircraft came from the Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve Command (Grant, 2003, p. 10). 
 
Figure 2: Total number of coalition aircraft 
Source: (Grant, 2003). 
 
 
Figure 3: Strike sorties 
Source: (Grant, 2003). 
On March 20, 2003, at 3.33, less than an hour after the deadline ultimatum given by President 
Gorge W. Bush to Saddam Hussein, the first raid on Baghdad started, and this is how the operation Iraqi 
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Freedom began. The objectives of the operation disclosed by Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld 
were as follows: 
 to end the regime of Saddam Hussein; 
 to identify, isolate and eliminate Iraq's weapons of mass destruction; 
 to search for, capture or drive out terrorists; 
 to collect intelligence related to terrorist networks in Iraq and beyond; 
 to collect intelligence on the global network of illicit weapons of mass destruction activity; 
 to end sanctions and immediately deliver humanitarian relief to the displaced and the many 
needy Iraqi citizens; 
 to secure oil fields and resources, which belong to Iraqi people; 
 to create the conditions for Iraq's rapid transition to a representative government (Garamore, 
2003). 
In fact, the war against Iraq waged by the US and its allies from March 20 to April 15, 2003, 
boiled down to de facto control over one of the most important areas of oil production in the world. In 
this context, the US command in 2003, in a secretive and very detailed way, when planning a military 
operation including air operations, analyzed the real potential of Iraqi air defense capabilities. On that 
account, a combined air-ground operation was prepared. 
The Iraqi Freedom operation began with the use of several BGM-109 Tomahawks and F-117A and 
F-16 aircraft that struck a bunker in the suburbs of Baghdad, which was believed to be the location of 
Saddam Hussein and other important commanders. On the day preceding the air-missile attack, US air 
forces attacked artillery positions in southern Iraq because they were considered a real threat due to the 
possibility of using chemical ammunition against the coalition land forces in Kuwait. In the earlier days 
preceding the war, coalition air forces using B-1B aircraft destroyed the elements of the Iraqi integrated 
air defense system located in no-fly Zones, including Soviet production radar stations P-15, a radar close 
to the H3 airbase, and a radar detecting small altitudes air targets in Ruwayshid, near the Saudi and Jor-
danian border (Kopp, 2003). 
The main phase of warfare began with aircraft missiles strikes delivered by combat aircraft on se-
lected targets in Iraq. Later on, these strikes were carried out in series; in total there were over 300 of 
them. Attacks took place both, during the day, and at night and targeted industrial, economic, and mili-
tary facilities of the state control system, on the positions of the Iraqi troops, including the ground-based 
air defense systems and airports, which were systematically destroyed. 
At that time, a wide range of precise weapon systems was used. For example, during the operation 
Desert Storm 282 Tomahawk missiles were used, while in the Iraqi Freedom, in only 15 days, over 1000 
precision missiles and many thousands of self-guided bombs were fired. 
 
Table 1: The number of precision combat weapon systems used during the Iraqi Freedom op-
eration in 2003 
Type of the air destruction agent 
TLAM * Maverick WCMD * * LGB * * * JDAM * * * * 
% number % number % number % number % number 
4 802 4.6 918 4.5 908 43.7 8.716 32.8 6.542 
* Tomahawk Land Attack Missile; 
** WCMD – Wind-Corrected Munitions Dispenser e.g., CBU-103/105,SFW/107; 
*** LGB – Laser Guided Bomb, e.g., CBU-12/16/24/27/28 and EGBU-27; 
**** JDAM – Joint Direct Attack Munition, e.g., GBU-31/32/35/37.  
Source: Own elaboration 
In total, coalition planes dropped 29,199 bombs, rockets, and missiles of all kinds on Iraq. The 
Second Gulf War was characterized by the intensive use of weapons guided by laser beams, satellites, 
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and other types of missiles guided by signal or TV image. Two-thirds, i.e., 19,948 of the used airborne 
weapons were precision-guided munition. 
 
 
 
Figure 4: Munitions expended 
Source: (Grant, 2003). 
 
In attacks against Iraq, one of the most frequently used weapons were laser-guided bombs, joint di-
rect attack munition, and Mk 82 bombs. These three types of means accounted for 71% of all types of 
munition used during the Iraqi Freedom campaign. The rest of the aviation weapon systems contained 16 
other types. 
 
 
Figure 5: Most popular munitions 
Source: (Grant, 2003). 
 
The most effective was the rockets and bombs guided to the target with signals  
 from the outer space radio navigation system NAVSTAR. 
During the Iraqi Freedom operation, the precision-attack missiles HARM and MAVERICK also 
played a significant role in the disorganization of Iraq's air defense system. The latter is an American air-
to-ground tactical missile manufactured by Huges Aircraft Corporation and Raytheon Corporation, and 
it is designed to fight tanks, combat transporters, surface ships, to destroy launch stations, and other 
tasks. The anti-radiation missiles AGM-88 HARM (high-speed anti-radiation missile) from Raytheon 
Corporation were introduced to the armament of American air forces in 1982. The HARMs significantly 
contributed to the destruction of many radar stations in combat operations in Iraq. 
During the war against Iraq in 2003, American aircraft used the modernized variant of the "air-
ground class MAVERICK AGM-56G2 missile. New software, including the targeting system with a 
thermal warhead (heat guided) allowed to detect the target and remember its location. The same type of 
missiles had already been used in operations in former Yugoslavia, where airstrikes were carried out not 
only on military equipment and facilities but also on military warehouses and bridges. The impact effi-
ciency of this type of missiles was very high – it amounted to 97%. Most guided missiles were fired 6 
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kilometers or less from the target. During the entire Iraqi Freedom operation, more than 900 missiles of 
this type were used. They were carried by A-10 aircraft fighters; each of them could carry up to six such 
missiles. American air forces had 60 aircraft of that type in the Gulf region.  
The appeared anti-radiation missiles HARM turned out to be the right choice for the campaign. 
Their 68 kg warhead caused great havoc among the Iraqi radar stations. The main carriers for these mis-
siles were F-14, F-15, F-16 CJ, F/A-18, and TORNADO. 
In Iraq, the main carriers of the HARM missiles were F-16 CJ, whose task under SEAD (Sup-
pression of Enemy Air Defense) was to destroy the enemy's ground-based air defense systems. There 
were about 70 aircraft of this type in the American air forces, and they were based at the airports in Ku-
wait, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and Turkey. The upgraded software and security equipment in the HARM 
missiles allowed to increase the accuracy in targeting the attacked objects. 
In total, during the war, the coalition air forces used about 400 HARM anti-radiation missiles. 
They were also carried by F-117 attack aircraft, EA-6B electronic warfare aircraft, and F/A-18 combat 
jets. The greatest concern of Americans was the anti-aircraft shield of Baghdad, whose main core were 
medium-range anti-aircraft missile systems and high saturation of short-range anti-aircraft missile sys-
tems and anti-aircraft artillery, whose launch and fire positions were not accurately located. The Iraqi 
radars were turned on and off in very short time sequences, which made it difficult for the HARM mis-
siles to reach the target. It showed the weaknesses of the HARM system – with the adopted tactics of 
Iraqi radar stations it had a problem with the proper location of the attacked object. 
In the first part of the operation, the air and naval forces of the coalition struck the previously se-
lected targets, including all Iraqi airports, which led to the elimination of many aircraft and airport infra-
structure.  
Based on the data, it can be stated that the air component focused the vast majority of its efforts, 
i.e., 78%, on air support for land forces, which was implemented under the Kill-box Interdiction/Close 
Air Support‖ (KI/CAS) strategy. 
 
 
Figure 6: Strikes by category 
Source: (Grant, 2003). 
 
The effort of air forces to support land forces coincided with the ongoing strategic bombing that 
began with two-day ―shock and awe‖ raids carried out with the use of  B-2As, F-117As, and F-15E Bea-
gles aircraft and several hundred of Tomahawk missiles that were fired from warships. As a result of 
these raids, Ba'ath Party facilities, Saddam's palaces, anti-aircraft stations, republican guard posts, and 
other targets in Baghdad were destroyed. The impact did not affect basic infrastructures, such as power 
plants and water intakes. Having analyzed air impacts, one can describe them as quite precise. The pur-
pose of the raids in the initial period of the operation was to affect the civilian population and the Iraqi 
authorities psychologically and to disrupt the functioning of the state. After the initial phase of air raids, 
there were long and intense day and night attacks on the remaining government facilities in the city. 
These raids were part of the preparation for ground forces that were to engage in combat in the Baghdad 
region. Their goals were satellite links, buildings of the Ministry of Information, various Baath and mili-
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tia and air defense facilities as well as republican guard positions and fire departments in Baghdad. As a 
result, airstrikes led to the disorganization of the defense system prepared by Iraq in the capital. The 
weapons used included laser-guided bombs Paveways and JDAMs. The uniqueness of this air force op-
eration should be emphasized, because civilians, water and power supply systems, bridges, and govern-
ment buildings that were not an integral part of the regime were not attacked during it. 
The successes already achieved on the first day of the air operation and the lack of counteraction 
by Iraqi aviation enabled the early start of land operations. On the night of March 21/22, during the 
Shock and Awe operation, the coalition land forces began the strike. The lack of possibility to initiate 
the land attack from Turkey was definitely a disadvantage. It was also the reason why the main land 
component was deployed in Kuwait. The move forward of ground forces was accompanied by increased 
activity of air forces. The latter, closely supporting land forces (CAS), also successfully performed deep 
air support tasks (AI). Therefore, no classical, sequential course of operations was used, where land and 
air operations followed special and aerial operations, but individual phases of operations were carried 
out in parallel. At the same time, to ensure the offensive-raiding nature of land forces operations, special 
forces conducted intensive activities aimed at capturing important objects: airports, bridges, oil wells. It 
is estimated that air forces conducted as many as 4,278 strikes (Mosley, 2003, p. 5) to support special 
forces, and thereby opened them the way to take control over various strategically important places. 
From March 30 to the end of the operation, the difference between CAS and AI aerial operations blurred 
completely. In order to eliminate the resistance points at the entire depth of the task closer to the tactical 
relations with land forces, all air forces capabilities were used, and the depth of strikes of helicopters and 
close air support aircraft often went beyond the depth of strikes of strategic aircraft. It was also the first 
time when B-1B strategic bombers were used to carry out CAS tasks. These aircraft equipped with four 
powerful 2-ton BLU-113 bombs each performed frequent duty in the waiting zone over Iraq and were 
engaged when called from the battlefield. The use of unmanned aerial vehicles for reconnaissance pur-
poses was also significant. The images transmitted in real-time were sent to the command of land forces, 
including the level of the company commander. 
An analysis of the combat operations of the coalition air forces indicates the versatility and multi-
dimensionality of the aviation usage that often had to take over the tasks of land forces. This situation 
was the result of a substantial, previously unforeseen pace of attack of the coalition forces, and thus the 
impossibility of introducing more and more troops. 
In addition, air forces did not carry out a several-week "preparatory" air operation for the land at-
tack, as was the case in 1991, but operated in parallel with the ground and special forces. 
Close air support played (CAS) a significant role by clearly going beyond the area of tactical oper-
ations and covering the tasks of air interdiction (AI) and strategic strikes. 
Over 50% of the overall effort was given to CAS. It was five times greater than in the Desert 
Storm operation. On the other hand, the Iraqi Freedom allocated more than twice as little effort, just 
14%, to win and maintain the control in the air. Of course, the main reason here was the 12-year fight for 
control in the air, conducted almost continuously since the end of the war in 1991 and covering 70% of 
Iraq's airspace. 
 
2. Organization and operation of the air defense system of Iraq during the Iraqi 
Freedom operation and the main reasons for the defeat  
The Iraqi strategy of waging war in 2003 focused from the very beginning on the idea of defense 
based on the ―city bastions,‖ where the Republican Guard, Fedayeen, and other loyal units were de-
ployed in urban areas, or the areas around them. The adopted defense model based on the cities was also 
supposed to provide better protection for soldiers against the consequences of air attacks and a certain 
limitation for the attacking air forces due to the possibility of large losses among civilians. Iraqis have 
deployed soldiers in schools, mosques, hospitals, historic sites, and in densely populated suburbs, which 
are excluded from bombing under the international law. In line with the adopted strategy, the Iraqis or-
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ganized a layered defense around Baghdad based on Republican Guard troops, and to a large extent, it 
resembled the Soviet siege doctrine of 1941–43. 
In the run-up to the Iraqi Freedom operation, out of the 220 combat aircraft at Iraq's disposal, only 
about 100 machines were fit for combat. That is why all Iraqi aviation was centered at eight airports (air 
bases). Before the start of warfare, Iraqis moved most of their combat aircraft: Mig-23, Mig-25, and 
Mig-29 (in sum around 50 units) near the Tammuz airbase (El-Habbania, 70 km west of Baghdad). On 
the basis of the directive of the commander-in-chief of Iraqi armed forces issued during the war, combat 
aircraft and helicopters were taken out of the command of the respective armed forces – their use, during 
the war, was governed by separate orders from Saddam Hussein himself. 
Initially, it was assumed that aircraft stationed at the Tammuz airbase were important in the Iraqi 
concept of warfare. Moreover, the command of the Iraqi air force intended to use their aircraft to support 
their land forces from the al-Bark airport (about 80 km north of Baghdad) and the al-Hurrya airport 
(about 240 km north of Baghdad), where approximately 20 combat aircraft were located. However, this 
plan was not implemented. It should be noted that these forces, as Iraqi command declared, were best 
prepared for action and, at the same time, most strongly protected by ground anti-aircraft systems. Prior 
to the commencement of operations at the airport of the al-Bakr base, there were aircraft and their crews. 
That changed on April 6, when the base commander General M. Faruk ordered the officers to leave for 
homes and wait until they would receive a special order; an order that was never issued. 
Such a decision resulted, among others, from the fact that the command of the Iraqi armed forces 
was aware of the fact that the coalition air forces would gain control in the air. Under these conditions, it 
was considered useless to use their own aircraft. However, it was predicted that they would be deployed 
during the defense of Baghdad, mainly when the enemy forces would approach the suburbs of the Iraqi 
capital. Again, for unknown reasons, it never happened. As a result, Iraqi air forces carried out only one 
reconnaissance flight from the Al-Bakr air base throughout the entire operation. 
The main assumptions of Iraqi air defense tactics boiled down to a very short stay of anti-aircraft 
weapon systems at fire stations. Total control in the air of the US and UK air forces, which carried out 
missile-bomb attacks on objects located in Iraq, caused a significant weakening and the need to decen-
tralize the command of Iraqi troops – subunits of anti-aircraft systems, which hindered, and in many 
cases even prevented the use of radar information from the stations that were located in the prohibited 
zones. The Soviet production anti-aircraft missile systems (S-75 and S-125) that were in possession of 
the Iraqi armed forces were not technologically modernized before the operations. 
Before 2002, the Iraqi armed forces partly modified other air defense systems, which largely came 
from the Soviet era, with newer equipment that was obtained from various sources. As a result, before 
the outbreak of another war in the Persian Gulf, Iraq's air defense systems were a mixture of western and 
older Eastern European and Far East technologies. An important element of the qualitative improvement 
of Iraq's air defense system was technical assistance provided by China. It concerned the laying of fiber 
optic cables between various air defense nodes, especially in southern Iraq. As a result, it was supposed 
to limit electronic emissions of the air defense devices, which normally could be easily detected and 
located on the basis of standard reconnaissance activities carried out from the air. Despite these difficul-
ties in detecting elements of the air defense system, American pilots were in a comfortable situation be-
cause they had the support of specialized aircraft specially designed to detect radar positions and anti-
aircraft missile systems and disrupt their work. Moreover, American pilots could carry out attacks on 
radar stations from a distance of several dozen kilometers. In some parts of the country, Iraq was found 
to have attempted to block the global positioning system (GPS) that NATO forces used to target missiles 
at targets accurately. It was not entirely known whether those so-called GPS jammers were of domestic 
production or had been illegally purchased. 
The analysis od Iraq's potential for air defense confirmed that in 1990 Iraq had 16,000 radar-
guided surface-to-air missiles (SAM), mainly of Soviet production: SA-2, SA-3, SA-7, SA-8, SA-13, 
SA-14, and SA-16 and Roland produced by France and Germany. Iraq also had a wide range of Soviet 
mobile SAM systems, including SA-6 Gainful and SA-9 Gaskin. Of these, the most famous was Gainful, 
which inflicted heavy losses on Israeli air force during the Yom Kippur war in October 1973. 
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Table 2: Air defense command 
SYSTEMS 
1990 * 1995 * 2000 2002 
AD GUNS ~ 4.000 ~ 5.500 ~ 6.000 ~ 6.000 
130mm  + + + + 
100mm  + + + + 
100mm KS-19 + + + + 
85mm  + + + + 
57mm S-60 + + + + 
57mm ZSU-57-2 SP + + + + 
37mm M-1939 + + + + 
23mm ZSU-23-4 SP + + + + 
SAM   ~ 2.300 ~ 2.000 
 SA-2 160 + 150 125 
 SA-3 140 + 110 100 
 SA-6 ~ 300 + 150 125 
 SA-8 0 
 SA-9 /  -13 + 2.000 125 
 SA-7 /  -14 + + 1.500 
 SA-16 ? ? ? ? 
 Roland 100 + + + 
 Crotale 5 5 5 + 
 Aspide - - + + 
 
Source: Own elaboration on the basis of https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/iraq/air-
defence-equipment.htm 
 
The most modern mobile SAM in the Iraqi army was the SA-8 Gecko short-range system. Its nor-
mal range of destruction of air targets was 1.1-5 nautical miles for targets flying between 100 and 16,500 
feet. The most common tactic used against SA-8 was the use of anti-radar missiles or flying above its 
effective range. The self-propelled AAA ZSU-23/4 and MANPADS (Man-portable air-defense) systems 
supplemented the air defense. The portable anti-aircraft missiles sets MANPADS were equipped with 
missiles with thermal warheads that were designed to destroy targets at low altitudes and did not need 
accurate information from radar indicators. Iraq had an older type of MANPADS (SA-7, SA-14). 
In addition, Iraqi air defense possessed more than 7,500 AAA units, which protected all the im-
portant military and civilian facilities. Some of these systems were located on the roofs of government 
facilities in Baghdad. 57mm and 37mm anti-aircraft guns, self-propelled AAA ZSU-23/4 and ZSU-57/2 
systems, and hundreds of light anti-aircraft 14.5mm and 23mm machine guns constituted the backbone 
of the integrated air defense system. Based on the UN report, it can be stated that Iraq did not return a 
large amount of military equipment to Kuwait after the Gulf War in 1991, including one Hawk battery 
and 675 Russian surface-to-air missiles. 
For major defense areas such as Baghdad, airports, chemical production complexes and nuclear fa-
cilities, air defense systems were particularly dangerous for aircraft operating below 10,000 feet. 
To sum up, it can be said that the Iraqi air defense system was relatively well organized and com-
bined the features of several systems. Multilayer air defense around Baghdad was more extensive than 
that surrounding most of the Eastern European cities during the Cold War and several times stronger 
than the one that defended Hanoi in the later stages of the Vietnam War. In the opinion of military ex-
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perts, if it were assured that it would function as intended, that air defense system was able to protect 
key facilities in Iraq effectively. 
Moreover, the quantitative and qualitative analysis of Iraqi air defense shows that it was one-third 
stronger in 2000 than during the first Gulf War in 1991. In 2002, Iraq already had an integrated air de-
fense system (IADS) in which SAM systems of the various range covered all the area and created a pro-
tective umbrella. In particular, it was so in the Baghdad and Tikrit regions. In addition, air defense in the 
no-fly zones was mainly based on AAA, MANPADS, and a small number of SAMs. These were the 
means that could move quickly and organize ad hoc anti-aircraft ambushes. Command of the anti-
aircraft resources in no-fly zones was decentralized. The information about air targets was received by 
radars deployed outside no-fly zones or from reconnaissance. Obtaining information from the radar indi-
cators that were located at a fairly large distance from the anti-aircraft weapon systems resulted in its 
insufficient accuracy and timeliness for precise determination of the azimuth, distance, and altitude of 
the target. 
In no-fly zones, apart from anti-aircraft artillery (AAA), MANPADS SA-7 and SA-14 were also 
used to fire at low-altitude aircraft. In this regard, it should be noted that Iraq did not have more modern 
MANPADS types like SA-16 and SA-18. 
Although in the no-fly zones Iraqi air defense forces were much smaller than around Baghdad and 
Tirkit, where the main air defense forces were deployed, pilots of allied forces had to be very vigilant 
and careful. This was mainly due to the tactics of using the anti-aircraft weapon systems, which could 
unexpectedly appear in the no-fly zones, then open fire on the aircraft and quickly retreat to new posi-
tions. According to intelligence data, anti-aircraft systems arrived from the Baghdad region that was 80-
100 km away from their operating areas and remained there for no more than two days, after which they 
returned to the areas of their permanent locations. Only in 2001, the coalition lost nine unmanned air-
craft Predator over the territory of Iraq. The last such event took place in the northern part of Iraq in the 
no-fly zone on December 23, 2002, where the UAV was shot down by an Iraqi fighter. 
According to the coalition‘s assessments, the air defense system in central Iraq was in a similar 
state of the organization as during the operation Desert Storm. The air defense operations center in 
Baghdad as well as the zone centers in Tai (central zone), Kirkit (northern zone) and Talili (southern 
zone) continued to operate. There was also the H-3 western center. These centers had the authority to 
command dozens of anti-aircraft weapons, SA-2, SA-3, SA-6 missile systems, and artillery systems or-
ganized in batteries or battalions. These centers commanded about 60 SAM (SA-2, SA-3, and SA-6) 
batteries and divisions. For comparison, there were 90 such subunits at the beginning of the Desert 
Storm. According to some estimates, there were 7,000-7,500 AAA 23mm or larger guns in these subu-
nits (IISS estimates that there were about 6,000 such guns). 
It should be noted here that despite the modernization of the command system, it did not have suf-
ficient information capacity. It had just a few means, like KARI, which was produced by THOMSON-
CSF (now TALES), before the Desert Storm operation. Despite the fact that 10-12 years ago, this system 
was difficult to disrupt, it could be effectively disorganized during the Iraqi Freedom. 
As a result of extensive post-war control in 1991, as part of sanctions imposed on Iraq, the com-
mand decided that all the best anti-aircraft systems would be regrouped into an open zone for flights 
between 33 and 35 degrees latitude, where they would not be attacked by aviation. 
The information that Iraq was in possession of SA-10 or SA-20 air defense systems was not con-
firmed. Moreover, the Pentagon has not released any information confirming the presence of these sys-
tems in Iraq. 
 It was also recognized that older SAMs: SA-2, SA-3, and SA-6 did not undergo any significant 
modernization. The reports that Iraq supposedly had a passive detection system, such as the Ukrainian 
Kolchuga, the Czech Tamara, or Trash Drum / Ramona were not confirmed either. 
 
  
Proceedings of International Scientific Conference ―Defense Technologies‖ DefTech 2019, 
Faculty of Artillery, Air Defense and Communication and Information Systems 
 
ISSN 2367-7902   38 
 
Conclusion 
Air operations in the Persian Gulf during the Operation Iraqi Freedom in 2003 were of different 
nature to those that took place in 1991 war. They were strategic airstrikes of a sequential nature, which 
by destroying the highest value targets, consequently weakened the Iraqi defense system. A series of 
sequential attacks, the so-called  ―series warfare – sequential attack‖ on elements of the early warning 
system, airports, and anti-aircraft systems (missiles launchers and artillery) became the primary objec-
tives. Each of these destroyed targets has opened a way to strike the next one. 
Moreover, the Iraqi Freedom operation was carried out by relatively small land forces, with strong 
air support and significant involvement of the infantry and special forces. It is estimated that it was the 
first conflict of the 21st century in which the use of all components allowed to achieve a synergy effect. 
Once again, the thesis has been confirmed that the best for air strikes (strategic and tactical) are air 
forces because they allow to achieve political and military goals the fastest, both, by themselves, and in 
cooperation with other types of armed forces (Zdrodowski & Marciniak, 1998). When assessing the pre-
disposition of the air force to perform strategic attacks during Iraqi Freedom, one should turn attention to 
the need to have different air platforms with high combat capabilities (Szpyra, 1998). 
Operation Iraqi Freedom has broken the standard that only obtaining control in the air is a prereq-
uisite for starting a land or sea operation. In this case, the fight over control in the air was carried out 
simultaneously to strategic strikes and CAS. Offensive air operations and strategic strikes conducted at 
the same time as part of the air operations created particularly difficult and complex conditions for the 
Iraqi air defense system to undertake effective countermeasures. Difficulties in the efficient functioning 
of the anti-aircraft system stemmed, among other things, from a large number of objects (centers of 
gravity) in need of a strong shield. The complexity of operations of anti-aircraft forces in case of com-
bined air operation also results from the diverse nature and variety of defended objects (of linear, point, 
or surface nature), as well as their location. Such a diverse nature, structure and location of centers of 
gravity requires air defense to have modern reconnaissance, fire, and command systems adequate to the 
predicted air threat. There are no doubts that only if Iraq had had state-of-the-art anti-aircraft systems, it 
would have been able to provide an effective defense to the center of gravity. What we mean here is also 
having the possibility of choosing the optimal method defending the given object, i.e., zone defense, 
object (direct) defense, or zone-object defense. 
According to military experts, other factors also largely contributed to the successes of the coali-
tion forces. One of them was that the defense was carried out in a situation of a disrupted and disor-
ganized command system of the Iraqi armed forces. Moreover, desertations and escapes from the anti-
aircraft positions were a big problem. 
There are no doubts that the Iraqi air defense system in the first and second war in the Persian Gulf 
had to face the most modern air weapon systems that had been invented so far. An additional difficulty 
in its functioning was that it had to act alone without the support of an ally. The outcome of the first and 
second clash of the Iraqi air defense with the state-of-the-art air technology of the United States and oth-
er coalition countries proved to be catastrophic. It confirmed, at the same time, that the Iraqi system was 
largely an arsenal of outdated means of reconnaissance, command, and combat, which only seemed dan-
gerous and threatening. In fact, it turned out that it was not able to resist modern airpower.  
When assessing the course and results of the Second Gulf War, it can be concluded that many oth-
er, more technologically and organizationally advanced air defense systems would have survived. How-
ever, in all probability, with a better command organization, the Iraqi air defense could have been more 
efficient. 
Despite the specificity of the environment in which the warfare was conducted, one can certainly 
draw conclusions of a universal nature that should be taken into account in the process of enhancing 
national air defense systems. It is pertinent especially to the armed forces of countries that have similar 
anti-aircraft potential. From the Polish perspective, this is important, because especially the armament of 
the Iraqi anti-aircraft system was, in many respects, analogous to the one we currently have in the Polish 
armed forces. Analyzing the weaknesses of Iraqi air defense, we have the opportunity to learn about our 
own shortcomings. In our opinion, both the First and Second Gulf War as well as subsequent military 
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operations in Libya, Ukraine, and Syria should provide a platform for serious reflection, mainly on 
choosing a rational development path for the national air defense. 
In spite of a lot of sentiment for the S-125, KRUG, KUB or OSA sets, we believe that the current-
ly undertaken ―cosmetic‖ resuscitation attempts to modernize some parts of the anti-aircraft defense sys-
tem cannot bring the desired results, because often over 30-year-old missiles sets in case of confronta-
tion with modern air forces would never provide an effective defense of the endangered objects, regard-
less of their nature, type or location. Therefore, in many armed forces, it is necessary to replace outdated 
anti-aircraft defense weaponry, and it should not be put off in time. In our opinion, we should focus on 
mobile, multi-channel systems, resistant to interference, and capable of conducting independent (auton-
omous) operations in any battlefield environment. 
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